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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Ibrahim McCants appeals his judgment of conviction 
and sentence. McCants argues he was wrongly convicted based 
on evidence that was found during an unconstitutional search. 
He also claims his sentence cannot stand because he was 
wrongly designated a career offender under the United States 
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Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I 
On the afternoon of June 28, 2015, a New Jersey woman 
dialed 911 to report an ongoing domestic dispute. Here’s how 
the call went: 
CALLER: Can I have the number to East Orange 
Police Department. 
DISPATCHER: You need where? 
CALLER: East Orange Police Department. It’s 
[sic] emergency. 
DISPATCHER: What’s the problem? 
CALLER: This guy is out here beating up his 
girlfriend. He’s about to kill her. 
DISPATCHER: Where’s this at? 
CALLER: It’s on Grove Street in East Orange. 
DISPATCHER: Grove and—where on Grove? 
CALLER: Grove and, and, and like Williams 
Street. 
DISPATCHER: What is he wearing? 
CALLER: He’s wearing a red hat, with braids 
and he’s beating her up really bad right now I 
wanna break—I wanna break it up but, I don’t 
wanna do nothing. 
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DISPATCHER: No—you don’t want to do that. 
Stay—hold on a second, ma’am. 
United States v. McCants, No. 15-551, 2016 WL 4705452, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2016). As the operator was preparing to 
dispatch police to the scene of the altercation, the caller 
repeated “he is beating her up really badly” and stated, “I think 
he has a gun.” Id. The caller then hung up and the operator 
dispatched the call in this way:  
Grove and William, Grove and William, right 
now from a caller, it’s a male beating a female 
really badly, male has braids with a red hat . . . . 
Again, it’s going to be Grove and William. Male, 
female. Male beating a female. Male has braids 
red hat—at this time, I am advising the caller not 
to intervene . . . . Now she is saying she believes 
he has a gun . . . . Red hat and braids. Alright, the 
caller disconnected.  
Id.  
East Orange police were in the area at the time the call 
was dispatched and they found a man matching the description 
near 146 Grove Street within one minute. Officer Moses 
Sangster was the first to arrive on the scene. He “noticed a male 
with dreads and a red hat” walking north on Grove Street with 
a woman. App. 76. The couple was later identified as Appellant 
Ibrahim McCants and Chelsea Fulton. Two other officers—
Stephen Rochester and Cory Patterson—also arrived on the 
scene within minutes after hearing the call. Before they 
approached the couple, Officer Rochester confirmed with the 
dispatcher that “the male actor involved had dreadlocks.” App. 
78. Officers Rochester and Patterson then “immediately 
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engaged” McCants and frisked him due to the “nature of the 
call for service.” Id. During the pat down, Officer Rochester 
found a loaded handgun inside a fanny pack McCants was 
wearing. The officers placed McCants under arrest and 
recovered distributable quantities of heroin.  
Several written police reports described the interactions 
between McCants and Fulton when the officers arrived at the 
scene. Officer Rochester reported that he observed McCants 
“speaking with a black female.” Id.1 Both McCants and Fulton 
confirmed in separate interviews they had been arguing, 
though Fulton said, “at no point did the argument get physical.” 
App. 82. Officer Crystal Singleton and Detective Jaleesa Wreh 
reported that Fulton showed no signs of injury.  
II 
A grand jury charged McCants with unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession with intent to distribute 
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and (b)(1)(C). 
McCants filed a pretrial motion to suppress the firearm and 
drugs and requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion, 
arguing the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that he 
was engaged in criminal activity before they frisked him. The 
 
1 Although the parties largely agreed on the facts, they 
disputed whether McCants and Fulton were arguing when the 
officers arrived. The Government claimed they were “yelling 
at each other.” McCants, 2016 WL 4705452, at *2. But 
McCants argued in his motion to suppress they were not and 
Fulton corroborated McCants’s account in an affidavit. The 
District Court did not make any factual findings regarding this 
dispute.  
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Government opposed the motion, and the District Court denied 
it without oral argument. The Court found that the stop was 
based on reasonable suspicion because the caller’s 
“anonymous tip bore sufficient indicia of reliability.” 
McCants, 2016 WL 4705452, at *7.  
The District Court then conducted a stipulated bench 
trial, and McCants was found guilty as charged on both counts. 
The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSR) in which it designated McCants a 
career offender. McCants objected to the PSR, arguing that his 
two previous second-degree robbery convictions in New Jersey 
did not qualify as crimes of violence under § 4B1.2 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Had the convictions not qualified as 
crimes of violence, his advisory range would have been 
lowered from 168–210 months to 63–78 months under 
Guidelines § 2K2.1. The District Court overruled McCants’s 
objection, concluding that his two prior robbery convictions 
qualified as crimes of violence. At sentencing, the Court varied 
downward, imposing a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment 
followed by three years of supervised release. McCants timely 
appealed.  
III 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). McCants argues that the District Court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress and in finding that his 
prior robbery convictions qualified as crimes of violence under 
Guidelines § 4B1.2. We review the District Court’s factual 
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 
United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 2015). We 
review de novo the Court’s determination that a conviction 
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constitutes a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. United 
States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2017). 
IV 
We begin by addressing McCants’s argument that he 
was wrongly convicted because the District Court admitted 
into evidence the fruits (drugs and a gun) of an unconstitutional 
search. The dispositive question underlying this argument is 
whether the anonymous 911 tip provided sufficient indicia of 
reliability for reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal 
activity.  
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although 
searches generally require warrants supported by probable 
cause, officers may conduct brief investigatory stops under 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), if they have “reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Such reasonable suspicion 
requires “at least a minimal level of objective justification for 
making the stop” and more than an “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” of criminal activity. Id. 
at 123–24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27). We evaluate the totality of the circumstances 
in considering “whether a reasonable, trained officer standing 
in [the officer’s] shoes could articulate specific reasons 
justifying [the] detention.” United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 
239, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 
2003)).   
A body of caselaw has developed over the years 
involving anonymous reports to police of criminal activity. 
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These tips can provide reliable information helpful to 
investigations and can create reasonable suspicion of ongoing 
criminal activity. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 
(2014). Whether an anonymous tip provides enough 
information for reasonable suspicion depends “upon both the 
content of information possessed by police and its degree of 
reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).  
Our Court has identified five factors that indicate 
reliability for anonymous tips: 
(1) The tip information was relayed from the 
informant to the officer in a face-to-face 
interaction such that the officer had an 
opportunity to appraise the witness’s credibility 
through observation. 
(2) The person providing the tip can be held 
responsible if her allegations turn out to be 
fabricated. 
(3) The content of the tip is not information that 
would be available to any observer. . . . 
(4) The person providing the information has 
recently witnessed the alleged criminal activity. 
(5) The tip predicts what will follow, as this 
provides police the means to test the informant’s 
knowledge or credibility[.] 
United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(ellipsis in original). In assessing the reliability of a tip, courts 
within the Third Circuit must consider these factors with 
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reference to the totality of the circumstances presented in each 
case. Id.  
 Here, the District Court found that “the [c]aller’s 
anonymous tip bore sufficient indicia of reliability,” which 
provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop and 
frisk McCants consistent with Terry. McCants, 2016 WL 
4705452, at *7.  In the District Court’s view, the tip sufficed 
because the caller used the 911 system to report firsthand 
knowledge of ongoing domestic violence, and she gave an 
accurate description that was quickly confirmed by the police.  
McCants argues that the 911 call could not have 
provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to justify the 
stop for two main reasons: (1) the tip was vague and did not 
demonstrate sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2) the officers 
did not find corroborating evidence of domestic violence at the 
scene. These arguments are unpersuasive in light of controlling 
precedent. 
 First, McCants contends that the 911 call was unreliable 
because it was akin to the bare-bones tip deemed inadequate 
by the Supreme Court in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
In J.L., the police received an anonymous call “that a young 
black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid 
shirt was carrying a gun.” Id. at 268. The Supreme Court held 
that this “bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant” 
who did not explain the basis for his tip lacked sufficient 
indicia of reliability. Id. at 271. But the facts of McCants’s 
appeal differ from J.L. in important respects. Here, the 911 
caller gave a firsthand account of ongoing criminal activity, as 
well as a highly specific and accurate description of the 
suspect’s location, clothing, and hair. In J.L., the informant 
reported significantly fewer details and described potentially 
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innocuous behavior without explaining why the informant 
thought the subject was committing (or was about to commit) 
a crime. Because of these differences, we disagree with 
McCants that the 911 call mirrors the limited and vague report 
in J.L.  
As the Government argues, the indicia of reliability in 
McCants’s case are like those in Navarette v. California. The 
Supreme Court there concluded that a tip created reasonable 
suspicion of drunk driving because it was highly specific, 
based on substantially contemporaneous eyewitness 
knowledge, and reported over the 911 system. Navarette, 572 
U.S. at 399–401. The Court explained that the eyewitness’s 
firsthand knowledge of ongoing criminality “lends significant 
support to the tip’s reliability.” Id. at 399. So too here, where 
police were able to confirm the detailed description of the 
suspect within minutes of the call. In fact, McCants was 
engaged by police much more quickly than was Navarette, who 
wasn’t stopped until eighteen minutes after the dispatcher’s 
call. Id. In Navarette, the Supreme Court also reasoned that the 
911 call bolstered the tip’s credibility because the system’s 
ability to identify callers is a safeguard against false reports. Id. 
at 400. Although 911 calls are not per se reliable and the police 
in this case did not identify the caller, the informant’s use of 
the 911 system here adds to the tip’s reliability in the same way 
it did in Navarette. 
Relatedly, McCants argues that the District Court did 
not give adequate consideration to three of the reliability 
factors we identified in Torres: the lack of face-to-face 
interaction between the informant and police; the absence of 
predictive information in the call; and the fact that the content 
of the caller’s tip was available to any observer. Although it is 
true that the 911 call here does not present all of the reliability 
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factors, this deficiency does not preclude a finding of 
reasonable suspicion because, as we have explained, “a tip 
need not bear all of the indicia—or even any particular 
indicium—to supply reasonable suspicion.” Torres, 534 F.3d 
at 213. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it 
concluded that the tip was sufficiently reliable because it met 
two of the factors: the informant “recently witnessed the 
alleged criminal activity,” McCants, 2016 WL 4705452, at *5 
(quoting Brown, 448 F.3d at 249–50), and can be “held 
responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated,” id. at 
*6 (quoting Brown, 448 F.3d at 249).  
McCants next argues that “[n]o reasonable officer 
would have stopped and frisked” him based on an allegation of 
ongoing domestic violence when Fulton, the putative victim, 
showed no signs of injury. McCants Br. 30. This argument too 
is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Navarette, 
where the officers followed Navarette’s car for five minutes 
without noticing any sign of drunk driving. The absence of 
corroborative evidence, the Court held, did not negate the 
reasonable suspicion created by the 911 call. Navarette, 572 
U.S. at 403–04. In the Court’s opinion, “[o]nce reasonable 
suspicion of drunk driving arises, ‘[t]he reasonableness of the 
officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the 
availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.’” Id. at 
404 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989)).  
In considering the officers’ reasonable inferences about 
Fulton’s demeanor, we note that we have given “considerable 
deference to police officers’ determinations of reasonable 
suspicion given their own experience and specialized training 
to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that might well elude an 
untrained person.” United States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494, 499 
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(3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 2014)), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 159 (2018). And as the District Court noted, 
the Seventh Circuit addressed the circumstances common to 
domestic violence calls while upholding a Terry stop under 
facts similar to those presented in this appeal. See United States 
v. Wooden, 551 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2008).  
In Wooden, the police responded to an anonymous 
report that a tall, black male wearing a black jacket and blue 
jeans was arguing with his girlfriend and had drawn a gun at a 
specific location. Id. at 648. The police conducted a pat-down 
even though the couple was chatting amicably when the 
officers arrived. Id. at 648, 650. In upholding the stop, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that the report implied the need for 
a hasty response. Id. at 650. The court observed, along with 
other factors supporting reasonable suspicion, that “domestic 
violence comes and goes” and there is a “risk that an armed 
man may threaten the woman with him” with future violence 
if she does not remain calm when police arrive. Id.  
McCants’s argument regarding Fulton’s demeanor does 
not give proper weight to law enforcement officers’ 
experiences and training regarding domestic violence. He 
contends that while it was “plausible that the suspect car in 
Navarette was observed driving normally after running 
someone off the road,” no officer could have reasonable 
suspicion of ongoing domestic violence after approaching 
Fulton, who was composed and unscathed. McCants Br. 32. 
This comparison to Navarette is unpersuasive: considering 
officers’ experiences, it might be less plausible that a drunk-
driving suspect could drive normally for five minutes than that 
Fulton might appear calm and uninjured during her interaction 
with the police. See Wooden, 551 F.3d at 650. For these 
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reasons, the District Court did not err in deferring to the 
officers’ reasonable inferences regarding Fulton’s demeanor in 
light of the 911 call. 
In sum, viewing all the circumstances, the anonymous 
tip bore sufficient indicia of reliability and provided the 
officers with reasonable suspicion that justified the Terry stop. 
The caller used the 911 system to report an eyewitness account 
of domestic violence and provided the officers with a detailed 
description of the suspect and location, both of which were 
quickly confirmed by the police. Accordingly, we hold that the 
District Court did not err in denying McCants’s motion to 
suppress the evidence collected during the Terry stop.  
V 
We turn next to the sentence imposed upon McCants. 
The District Court agreed with the Probation Office that 
McCants is a career offender because two of his prior 
convictions for second-degree robbery in New Jersey qualify 
as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The 
Guidelines define a “crime of violence” as any felony offense 
under state or federal law that: 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another [the “elements” clause], or 
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex 
offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or 
unlawful possession of a firearm described in 26 
U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as 
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defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c) [the “enumerated 
offense” clause]. 
Guidelines § 4B1.2(a).  
A 
We use the categorical approach to determine whether 
a prior conviction is a predicate offense for a crime-of-violence 
sentencing enhancement. United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 
599, 606 (3d Cir. 2018). In doing so, we “compare the elements 
of the statute under which the defendant was convicted to the 
[G]uidelines’ definition of crime of violence.” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2018)).  
McCants’s designation as a career offender was based 
on two convictions under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1, which 
provides: 
a. Robbery defined. A person is guilty of robbery 
if, in the course of committing a theft, he: 
(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon 
another; or 
(2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him 
in fear of immediate bodily injury; or 
(3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit 
any crime of the first or second degree. 
. . . . 
b. Grading. Robbery is a crime of the second 
degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree 
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if in the course of committing the theft the actor 
attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or 
attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is 
armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate 
use of a deadly weapon. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1.  
We can look beyond the elements of the statute for this 
comparison only if it is “divisible” and lists “elements in the 
alternative, and thereby define[s] multiple crimes.” Mathis v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). The statute is 
phrased disjunctively, using “or” to offset subsections (a)(1) 
through (a)(3). Such a statute is divisible if it lists “elements” 
of the offense and not “means” of committing that offense. Id. 
at 2248. “‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s 
legal definition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to 
sustain a conviction.’” Id. (quoting Elements of Crime, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). “At a trial, they 
are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to 
convict the defendant, and at a plea hearing, they are what the 
defendant necessarily admits when he pleads guilty.” Id. 
(citation omitted). “Means,” on the other hand, are “various 
factual ways of committing” a single element. Id. at 2249.  
 McCants insists the New Jersey robbery statute is 
indivisible because the alternatives in subsections (a)(1)–(3) 
are means, rather than elements. He contends that under 
Mathis, alternatively-phrased statutes contain elements only 
when each subsection carries different punishments, which is 
not true of the New Jersey robbery statute. We disagree. In 
Mathis, the Supreme Court explained that “the statute on its 
face may resolve the issue” of characterizing alternatives. Id. 
at 2256. In doing so, the Court used differences in punishment 
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as an example of a clear statutory clue, not as the only 
permissible textual analysis. See id.  
 We agree with the Government that the New Jersey 
robbery statute sets out alternative elements for sustaining a 
conviction rather than the means of committing the offense. 
Crimes comprise elements; means illustrate ways of satisfying 
individual elements. If the subsections of § 2C:15-1 were 
means, they would list “diverse means of satisfying a single 
element” of robbery. Id. at 2249 (emphasis added). But the 
statute does not identify an individual element of which 
subsections (a)(1)-(3) are mere examples—it states no 
overarching genus of which they are species. Instead, it lists in 
the disjunctive three separately enumerated, alternative 
elements of robbery. 
By contrast, in Mathis, the burglary statute defined 
burglary to require “enter[ing] an occupied structure,” IOWA 
CODE § 713.1, and gave as examples of an occupied structure 
“any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle,” id. 
§ 702.12. Thus, the element (the genus) for burglary was an 
occupied structure and the means (the species) were any 
building, structure, or land, water, or air vehicle. Here, the 
alternative elements for robbery are (a)(1)-(3) and the means 
are the various types of force, threats, and crimes that could 
satisfy those subsections. Structurally, § 2C:15-1 puts 
subsections (a)(1)-(3) on the level of elements, not means. 
Subsections (a)(1)–(3) are elements because each 
requires different proof beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a 
second-degree robbery conviction. Under (a)(1), the 
prosecutor must prove that the defendant inflicts injury or uses 
force upon another person. However, the defendant need only 
threaten or place another person in fear of immediate bodily 
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injury under (a)(2), or threaten to commit another first- or 
second-degree crime under (a)(3). 
Our conclusion would be different if McCants could 
show “that a jury” in New Jersey “need not make any specific 
findings (or a defendant admissions) on” which of these 
subsections a defendant violated. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. If 
“[a] jury could convict even if some jurors conclude[d] that the 
defendant [violated (a)(1)] while others conclude[d] that he 
[violated (a)(2)],” then the subsections would be means, not 
elements. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because 
McCants makes no such showing, we rely on the phrasing and 
structure of § 2C:15-1 to hold that subsections (a)(1)-(3) list 
elements, not means. 
This analysis parallels our decision in United States v. 
Blair, 734 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2013), where we held that 
Pennsylvania’s similar robbery statute was divisible because of 
its “clearly laid out alternative elements.” Id. at 225. McCants 
argues that our reasoning in Blair has been abrogated by 
Mathis. But this argument is a nonstarter because earlier this 
year we reaffirmed that the Pennsylvania robbery statute is 
divisible. United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir. 
2018) (citing Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256; Blair, 734 F.3d at 
225).2 Because N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1 lays out alternative 
 
2 We held that this Pennsylvania robbery statute, which 
was alternatively-phrased, is divisible: 
 
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course 
of committing a theft, he: 
(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; 
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(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts 
him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury; 
(iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit 
any felony of the first or second degree; 
(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or 
threatens another with or intentionally puts him 
in fear of immediate bodily injury; or 
(v) physically takes or removes property from 
the person of another by force however slight. 
Peppers, 899 F.3d at 231 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 3701(a) (June 24, 1976 to May 16, 2010)). Unlike the New 
Jersey statute, a few subsections of the Pennsylvania statute 
carried different penalties. Robbery under subsection (a)(1)(iv) 
was a second-degree felony, while subsection (a)(1)(v) was a 
third-degree felony. Otherwise, robberies under the other 
subsections were first-degree felonies. Id.  
In Ramos, we explained that a similarly-structured 
Pennsylvania assault statute is divisible two ways. 892 F.3d at 
606. First, the statute “proscribes two alternative degrees of 
aggravated assault, which are subject to different maximum 
sentences.” Id. at 609. Second, we found “the statute is further 
divisible into four, alternative second-degree aggravated 
assault offenses” because the statute uses disjunctive language 
to list alternative elements—rather than alternative factual 
means for committing the offense—in each subsection. Id. 
Accordingly, disjunctive language setting out elements that 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt can independently 
show the statute is divisible on its face.  
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elements upon which prosecutors can sustain a second-degree 
robbery conviction, we hold that the statute is divisible.  
B 
 Having determined that the relevant statute is divisible, 
we must ascertain whether McCants’s New Jersey robbery 
convictions were predicate offenses that render him a career 
offender. For divisible statutes, we use the modified 
categorical approach to decide whether the defendant was 
convicted of a qualifying offense under the Guidelines. 
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19–20, 26 (2005). This 
gives us recourse to the “Shepard documents”—which include 
the charging document, guilty plea allocution, jury 
instructions, and judgment of conviction—to determine the 
subsection upon which the conviction was based. United States 
v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2014). 
Although the charging documents do not state explicitly 
which subsection of the statute McCants was convicted under, 
they do indicate that McCants was charged with violent 
crimes.3 And a review of McCants’s plea colloquy leads 
necessarily to the conclusion that he pleaded guilty to violating 
subsection (a)(2) of the New Jersey robbery statute. Therein, 
McCants acknowledged using force in committing both 
robberies. Regarding the first robbery offense on December 13, 
2003, the court asked McCants: “On that day did you attempt 
or succeed by the use of threat of force, in taking some items 
from an individual in the City of Newark?” App. 266. He 
 
3 The first robbery indictment charges that McCants 
used or threatened the use of what the victim perceived as a 
deadly weapon. The second indictment charges that he 
threatened the use of a deadly weapon.  
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responded, “Yeah.” App. 267. Regarding the second robbery 
offense on April 28, 2004, the court asked McCants: “And on 
that occasion did you take or attempt to take from an individual 
by the threat of force some items?” Id. He again responded, 
“Yes.” Id. We agree with the Government that McCants’s 
admissions that he threatened or attempted to threaten another 
with force is evidence of guilt under subsection (a)(2), which 
requires that a defendant “[t]hreaten[] another with or 
purposely put[] him in fear of immediate bodily injury.”  
 Although McCants concedes that the colloquy shows he 
did not plead guilty under subsection (a)(1), which requires the 
use of force, he makes two semantic arguments that his 
admissions do not fall under subsection (a)(2). First, he 
contends the colloquy does not address injury or fear, which he 
believes are required by the statute. Second, he argues his 
admissions regarding force do not equate to threats of 
immediate bodily injury. Taken together, he claims the 
colloquy allows for the possibility that he was convicted under 
subsection (a)(3), which does not require violent force. 
We disagree that McCants’s colloquy shows he could 
have been convicted under subsection (a)(3). First, his 
semantic arguments are inconsistent with the plea colloquy. 
His admissions of attempting or successfully using threat of 
force to take items from individuals most closely match 
subsection (a)(2). Second, McCants points to nothing in the 
colloquy permitting even the inference that he pleaded guilty 
under subsection (a)(3). Had McCants pleaded guilty to 
subsection (a)(3), he would have needed to admit that he 
committed or threatened to commit another crime. Yet his plea 
colloquy makes reference to neither. Because he could not 
have pleaded guilty to subsection (a)(3) and McCants concedes 
he was not convicted under subsection (a)(1), the only logical 
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choice is subsection (a)(2). Thus, we have no reason to 
overturn the District Court’s finding that the natural reading of 
the plea colloquy is that McCants’s two prior robbery 
convictions fall under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1(a)(2).  
C 
Finally, we must decide whether McCants’s convictions 
under subsection (a)(2) are predicate offenses under either the 
“elements” clause or the “enumerated offense” clause of 
§ 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines. In our view, they satisfy both. 
Under the elements clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)), a conviction 
qualifies if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 
We have explained that the “use of physical force . . . involves 
the intentional employment of something capable of causing 
physical pain or injury to another person, regardless of whether 
the perpetrator struck the victim’s body.” Chapman, 866 F.3d 
at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted). Subsection (a)(2) of 
the robbery statute requires that the defendant “[t]hreaten[] 
another with or purposely put[] him in fear of immediate bodily 
injury.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1(a)(2). In New Jersey, 
“bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness or any 
impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 2C:11-1(a). Under 
both the Guidelines and New Jersey definitions, the defendant 
must place another in fear of physical pain or injury. Because 
§ 4B1.2(a)(1) does not mandate physical contact, New Jersey’s 
definition of “bodily injury” falls within the Guidelines’ 
definition of “crime of violence.” Accordingly, we hold that 
McCants’s conviction under subsection (a)(2) qualifies as a 
crime of violence under the elements clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1) 
of the Guidelines.  
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We reach the same result with regard to the enumerated 
offense clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)), which lists “robbery” as a crime 
of violence. When the Guidelines specifically list an offense, 
we “compare the elements of the crime of conviction to the 
generic form of the offense as defined by the States, learned 
treatises, and the Model Penal Code.” United States v. 
Marrero, 677 F.3d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011)), 
vacated on other grounds, 570 U.S. 929 (2013). The 
defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence if 
“the statutory definition of the prior conviction ‘substantially 
corresponds’ to the generic definition of the offense.” Id. 
(quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). 
McCants and the Government agree that “the generic 
definition of robbery is . . . the taking of property from another 
person or from the immediate presence of another person by 
force or by intimidation.” App. 199. We held in Graves that 
“generic robbery requires no more than de minimis force” to 
meet this definition. 877 F.3d at 503. In evaluating whether 
McCants’s robbery convictions qualify as crimes of violence 
under the enumerated offense clause, we must determine 
whether the New Jersey statute is broader than the generic 
offense.  
Subsection (a)(2) requires that the defendant 
“[t]hreaten[] another with or purposely put[] him in fear of 
immediate bodily injury.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1(a)(2). 
We agree with the Government that subsection (a)(2) falls 
within the definition of generic robbery because the statute 
requires the threat of bodily injury, which involves more 
force—and is therefore categorically narrower—than de 
minimis force, Graves, 877 F.3d at 504. Accordingly, we hold 
that McCants’s convictions under subsection (a)(2) qualify as 
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crimes of violence under the enumerated offense clause of 
§ 4B1.2(a)(2). Therefore, the District Court rightly designated 
McCants a career offender because his two prior convictions 
for second-degree robbery in New Jersey qualified as crimes 
of violence under the Guidelines. 
* * *  
The District Court did not err in denying McCants’s 
motion to suppress or in imposing his sentence. We will affirm 
the judgment of conviction and sentence.  
